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Abstract ' I. if 
In response to the 1980 Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, states have taken measures to enact their own environmental clean-up policies and 
initiatives. Previous studies have analyzed different variables leading states to adopt such 
programs. This study continues this research, providing a comprehensive review of 
literature and testing hypotheses concerning the relationships between state population, 
EP A region, fiscal expenditures/revenues, and effort/investment, and using data collected 
by the Environmental Law Institute (2001), this paper uses multivariate regressions to 
analyze three models. Similar to previous work, this paper finds population, fiscal 
resources, and pollution severity as major factors affecting states' adoption of brownfield 
redevelopment programs. 
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Initiating Development: An Evaluation of State Brownfield 
Redevelopment Policies and Initiatives 
The 200 I Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act defines 
a brownfield as "real property the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be 
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
contaminant" (Bergeson, 2002: 2). According to Hula (2001: 4), current "brownfield 
programs reflect an attack on fundamental assumptions ... of American toxic waste 
policy." Originally dominated by the federal government, the states have progressively 
become more involved in ensuring that these sites, are not only cleaned, but also 
redeveloped into economically usable properties. For example, states have begun 
voluntary programs, making use incentives to encourage private developers to take on 
different projects. As a result, the private sector has taken a leadership role in brownfield 
programs, allowing economic development to become a primary goal. 
Certain characteristics of states are associated with the adoption of brownfield 
redevelopment programs. Lester and Lombard (1990) in a comprehensive study of 
environmental protection policies identified several state characteristics associated with 
more extensive clean-up/redevelopment programs. Their model proposed four variables 
(severity, wealth, partisanship, organizational), which influenced a states' decision to 
enact these programs. Based on a further evaluation of relevant literature that test Lester 
and Lombard's (1990) proposals, I hypothesize that population size, region, federal 
grants, and pollution severity create states' capacity and desire to enact brownfield 
redevelopment programs. 
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Using the Environmental Law Institute's An Analysis a/State SuperfUnd 
Programs: 50 -State Study, 2000 Update, this paper tests the proposition that state 
success and staffing of brown fieldl voluntary programs are related to a state's (1) 
population size, (2) region, (3) fiscal expenditures and revenues, and (4) the severity of 
site pollution. 
Literature Review 
This review examines literature on American environmental policy and programs 
dealing with brownfield redevelopment. It begins by placing redevelopment policies in a 
historical context, providing background infonnation about federal and state roles in the 
process. This is followed by a discussion of a theoretical framework to identify specific 
state characteristics that lead to adoption of brownfield redevelopment programs. 
The 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), enacted by Congress in 1980, served as an early model of environmental 
redevelopment policy. According to Hula (2000: 2), in order to understand CERCLA, 
one must take into account "its strong commitment to ... restoring sites to a natural 
condition and imposing cleanup costs on those responsible for the site pollution." 
CERCLA sought this goal through two mechanisms: (1) total liability placed upon those 
found to be responsible for a site's contamination (Hula, 2001). (2) CERCLA stipulates 
the chief goal for the federal government, under the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), should is cleaning contaminated sites. According to Copeland (1997: 2) "when 
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[CERCLA] was enacted in 1980, [the policy] gave the federal government the lead role." 
Through a finn and centralized policy, the EPA used CERCLA to implement a rigorous 
policy aimed at cleaning contaminated sites. 
States Contend For Authority 
Even though CERCLA named the federal government as the leader in site 
rehabilitation for the nation's most contaminated sites, state governments also created 
redevelopment programs to deal with less dangerous sites. CERCLA and the 1986 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) require the EPA to confer with 
states concerning clean up efforts. However, states could begin their own cleanup 
programs only with a Memoranda of Agreement with the EPA. In any case, the EPA still 
remains in the leading role (Copeland, 1997). According to Hula (2001: 23), "typically, 
state participation demands extensive negotiation between state authorities and the EPA." 
CERCLA reserved America's "worst toxic sites for federal action," and these sites are 
placed on the National Priority List (NPL) (Hula, 2001: 3). However, it is important to 
note that there are only 1,300 sites, nationally, that have met the criteria to be placed on 
the NPL (Copeland, 1997). The remaining 30,000 contaminated sites "that do not present 
enough of a risk to be cleaned up under the federal program" have been left to states' 
discretion (Copeland, 1997: 3). States have assumed a leading role in cleaning these less 
polluted sites. Furthennore, there are 117 state funds specifically dedicated to these 
"non~NPL" sites (Environmental Law Institute, 2001). For that reason, even though 
CERCLA established a dominant role for the EPA, states have begun to create alternative 
policies. 
Initiating Development 7 
Recently, the federal government has begun to encourage states to assume a 
leading role in site cleanup. On January 11,2002, President G. W. Bush signed the Small 
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, which "provides relief 
from liability under CERCLA ... [and] authorizes increased funding for state and local 
programs that assess and clean up brownfields"(Bergeson, 2003: 3). Funds to clean 
brownfields doubled from $98 million in the 2002 fiscal year to $200 million in the 2003 
fiscal year. As recently as May 2005, the EPA distributed $75.9 million in brownfield 
redevelopment grants to state programs (Crowley, 2005: 2). The federal government is 
clearly promoting the decentralization of environmental authority. 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs 
States have begun to successfully employ voluntary programs to facilitate site 
cleanups. According to the Environmental Law Institute, by 2000, 49 states made use of 
formal voluntary cleanup programs. States note the progress that their programs have 
made relative to CERCLA. For example, 270 state sites in New York and 200 sites in 
Illinois have been cleaned, compared to 16 and 5 NPL sites in those respectively 
(Copeland, 1997: 4). Furthermore, Copeland (1997: 2) asserts that states have taken 
leadership of 10% ofNPL clean-ups. 
State success is attributed to the benefits offered to developers and other 
participants. Benefits include "less complex administrative organization, partial liability 
relied relief from cleanup liability[less rigid that CERCLA] and economic subsidies for 
developers," quenching the fear of future law suits (Hula, 200 I : 23). Furthermore, many 
states have redefined standards for completing site clean-ups. For example, the Michigan 
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Department of Environmental Quality employs separate standards for residential, 
commercial, and industrial sites. In addition, "the cleanup levels for known 
carcinogens ... [and] groundwater cleanup standards have been revised to .. .less stringent 
levels" (Hula, 200 I: 9). Through these voluntary programs, states are able to cooperate 
with developers and other private parties, facilitating site clean-up. 
Economic Redevelopment of Brownfields 
The goal of CERCLA and earlier clean-up programs rested solely on site clean-
up. However, more recent programs have stresses economic development. Brownfields 
are classified as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be 
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant or 
contaminant" (Wagner, 2004: 2). The goal of redevelopment seems implied by this 
definition. According to Hula (2001: 5), brownfield programs "stress the need to identify 
the planned use of the property after the clean-up is complete." It is not surprising that 
economic redevelopment and the opportunities have become a primary focus of state 
voluntary programs. Participation in brownfield redevelopment by these private 
developers is "not based on any appeal to civic obligation ... but simply that brownfields 
are sound business investments" (Hula, 2001:18). Furthermore, Howland (2003: 1) 
suggests that "when market conditions are strong, contamination relatively minor ... the 
private sector is more likely to be the sole initiator and implementer of redevelopment. 
Indeed, privately led brownfield redevelopment programs have become viable options for 
states. 
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As a result of private interests in bro"rnfield redevelopment, states are grappling 
with the task of balancing developers' economic interests with public participation and 
preferences. "Developers and local officials often argue that significant requirements for 
public participation can often slow ... kill specific site initiatives, " because community 
members are not aware of economic conditions and restrictions (Hula, 2000: 11). Hula's 
study goes on to present that 13 states do not require any sort of public participation. On 
the other hand, "if local residents are not engaged in the planning process, fatal 
opposition to the project is likely to develop later [on r (Hula, 2000: 11). States use 
different methods to maintain community involvement, ranging from public hearings to 
advisory boards. Wagner (2004: 8) presents an interview with a brownfields developer 
who states that "public/private partnerships ... understand [ing] each other's strengths and 
limitations ... support[ing] each other ... [has] helped even the more difficult projects to 
come to fruition." Even though communities and private developers have different 
perspectives concerning brownfield development, cooperation between the two parties 
can yield positive benefits. 
Theoretical Framework 
To identify specific state characteristics leading to adoption of brownfield 
redevelopment programs, it is important to review similar studies. 
Lester and Lombard (1990) present a comparative analysis, in which they propose 
four factors that influence a state's implementation of what they call environmental 
protection policies and programs. These include: 
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I. The severity argument essentially proposes that "public consumption of 
goods ... create severe pollution problems which ... bring about strong pressures 
for ... protection policies" (Lester and Lombard, 1990: 308). In states where 
pollution is higher, the demand for public action should increase. 
2. The wealth argument simply argues that states with larger "fiscal resources" 
have the monetary ability to create environmental protection programs (Lester 
and Lombard, 1990: 308). 
3. The partisanship argument uses political affiliation to explain which states 
will utilize these policies. "Democrats [are] more supportive of 
[environmental] efforts than Republicans," which can be attributed to voting 
patterns in state and federal legislatures (Lester and Lombard, 1990: 309). 
4. The organizational capacity argument claims that "centralization of the 
environmental bureaucracy promotes environmental protection policy" 
because this arrangement reduces conflict and overlap that occurs when 
multiple agencies are involved (Lester and Lombard, 1990: 309). 
Lester and Lombard's argument was tested in a study conducted by Bacot and Dawes 
(1997). Bacot and Dawes (1997: 355) explore "the dynamics surrounding the adoption 
and implementation of state policies," resulting in two proposed models: 
1. The expenditure model investigates the relationship between a state's 
"financial capacity to manage [brownfield redevelopment] programs." This is 
operationalized as a state's fiscal health-"the ratio of total state revenue 
minus total state spending." States with a higher fiscal health are more likely 
to engage in these programs. However, Bacot and Dawes (1997: 356) 
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recognize that "state expenditure decisions represent the budget preferences of 
state legislators." Political agenda setting plays a role in the enactment of 
state programs, therefore, even though a c;;tate may have the expenditures to 
facilitate brownfield redevelopment, political influences may result in other 
programs taking priority. 
2. The ranking model explores the strength of a state's "total programmatic 
effort" (Bacot and Dawes, 1997: 356). Beyond funding, agencies and 
institutions must be in place to enforce these environmental policies. This 
concept is ope rationalized based upon the primary state agency charges with 
managing environmental programs. Based upon Lester and Lombard's (1990) 
work, Bacot and Dawes (1997: 357) propose that a state with a "single 
agency" is more efficient than a "superagency" because administrative efforts 
are not divided. 
Bacot and Dawes (1997: 360) measure the empirical link between (1) state fiscal health, 
(2) pollution severity, (3) "political capacity to support environmental legislation" (i.e. 
political affiliation), (4) strength of the state's environmental group membership (Sierra 
Club), (5) region (Southern states vs. non-Southern states), and (6) state popUlation. 
Regression models find that pollution severity, population, environmental group strength, 
and region were statistically significant. In fact, both models find "population and 
pollution [to be] the overriding factors paramount to understanding state's environmental 
plights" (Bacot and Dawes, 1997: 360). However, these studies do not account for the 
influence that federal policies and funding have on state programs. "For example, 
innovative federal legislation stimulates state governments to take similar action," as 
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shown by state adoption of environmental clean-up programs modeled after CERCLA 
(Lester and Lombard, 1990: 312). Furthermore, Hula (2003: 21) found that states located 
in EPA Region 5 "on average, show a higher degree of innovation" in brownfield 
redevelopment, a majority of these states located in the "rust belt" (former industrial 
powerhouses). 
Using these two studies, and on the basis of previous literature this paper proposes 
three hypotheses: 
HI: 
Number of completed, redeveloped sites (in each state) = a + b I (state 
population) + bz (EPA region) + b3 (fiscal) + b4 (pollution severity), 
where the number of completed sites is dependent on state population, EPA region, fiscal 
income/spending, and pollution severity. 
Hz: 
Ratio of completed clean-ups to number of National Priorities List (NPL) 
sites = a + b I (state population) + bz (EPA region) + b3 (fiscal), 
where a ratio between redeveloped sites and NPL sites is created and is further 
dependent on state population, EPA region, fiscal income/spending, and pollution 
severity. 
H3: 
Effort and Investment = a + b I (state population) + bz (EPA region) + b3 
(fiscal) + b4 (pollution severity), 
where a state's effort and investment contributed to brownfield redevelopment is 
dependent on population, region, fiscal income/spending, and pollution severity. 
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Data and Methods 
This section outlines the design and methodology to be used to test a set of 
hypotheses relating characteristics of states to brownfield programs. This section 
includes a brief discussion of the sources of the data, the conceptualization and 
opemtionalization of variables, and the statistical techniques used. 
An Analysis of State Supertund Programs: 50 -State Study. 2000 Update 
As mandated by the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA), the EPA's State, Tribal, and Site Identification Center collects data concerning 
state environmental programs for the purpose of providing guidelines and suggestions for 
improvement. The Environmental Law Institute Center for State Local and Regional 
Environmental Programs has collected data on state level cleanups. Initially conducted in 
1989, this report was updated in 1990, 1991, 1993,1995, 1998, and in 2000. 
The Environmental Law Institute's (ELI) An Analysis of State Superfund 
Programs: 50 -State Study, 2000 Update includes an examination of all 50 U.S. states, 
Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, and full descriptions of each entity's statues, programs, 
staffing/funding, expenditures, standards, and activities. ELI collected this data through 
telephone interviews from state environmental program staff. ELI also conducted an 
analysis of "state documents, legislative reporting services, newsletters, state websites, 
and EPA documents" (Environmental Law Institute, 2001: 1). It is important to note that 
this data is based only on information onlbefore 2000 fiscal year (June 30, 2001). 
Furthermore, this study only discusses non-NPL (National Priority List) sites. ELI (2001: 
21) acknowledges that "differences in state programs ... limit[s] the comparability of 
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programs;" however, for the purpose of this paper, the data provided is more than 
sufficient. 
Brownfield Redevelopment as a Dependent Variable 
Each model utilizes some measurement of a state's support for brownfield 
redevelopment policies and initiatives as a dependent variable. According to Hula (2000: 
10), "commitment of public officials to the goals of formal policy" is a factor 
contributing to the outcome of brownfield redevelopment programs and initiatives. 
Furthermore, Hula (2000: lO) acknowledges that "the notion of commitment [support] is 
itself complex." Therefore, in accordance with the literature, each model conceptualizes 
different facets of measuring state support. 
The reported number of completed, redeVeloped sites is a dependent variable in 
the modeL The Environmental Law Institute provides data that accounts for the number 
of sites that have been completely cleaned since the start of each state's voluntary 
cleanup program. This model hypothesizes that the more support and resources a state 
provides to its program, the greater the sites cleaned. As opposed to simply measuring 
the number of sites completed in the 2000 fiscal year alone, this variable provides a 
comprehensive analysis of state support and state rates of completion over an extended 
period of time. For example, while New Jersey reports the completion of the most site 
clean-ups are 3,500 sites, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Louisiana have reported that 0 
(zero) sites have been completed. However, the ELI (2001) does acknowledge a variation 
in numbers of reported sites completed may be result of the fact that some programs were 
only recently established. It is also important to note that 12 states (Puerto Rico, 
Washington D.C., West Virginia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Arkansas, 
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Kansas, North Dakota, Nevada, and Idaho) do not report the number of completed sites 
within their respective jurisdictions. 
Model 2 creates a ratio between the number of state clean.ups and the number of 
National Priority List (NPL) sites reported within the state. The ELI (2001) reports an 
estimated 1200 sites as NPL sites. The ratio between these two measures estimates 
number of clean~ups relative to overall levels of pollution. The number ofNPL sites 
within a state is also an independent variable, and will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
Model 3 accounts for the state effort and investment to the brownfield 
redevelopment effort. Resources provided to redevelopment programs measure state 
support. In this case, a "resource" is operationalized as staff and government personnel 
who participate in the volunteer clean-up programs. The ELI (2001) recognizes that 
program organization varies among states; however 47 states reported information 
concerning staffing of their clean-up programs (West Virginia, Puerto Rico, Kansas, 
Idaho, and Washington D.C. did not report their number of staff). Furthermore, numbers 
of staff contributed to redevelopment programs vary from 555 in New Jersey to 3.5 
reported in South Dakota. Again, the ELI accounts for these variations as a result of 
funding or the early stages of some of the volunteer programs. This model also presents 
a ratio between the state population and staff. This ratio accounts for the population 
differences between states. For example, a less populated state may contribute a smaller 
absolute number of staff to their voluntary programs; however the percentage in 
relationship to the population could be larger than a more populated state. Specifically, 
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this dependent variable measures the number of staff per 100,000 people (state 
population).l 
Independent Variables 
Each model will be tested using four individual, independent variables: state 
population, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) region, fiscal revenuesl 
expenditures, and pollution severity. 
According to Bacot & Dawes (1997: 358), state population "contributes 
explanatory power ... by estimating the effects of size disparities on environmental effort 
across states." Furthermore, in their severity argument, Lester and Lombard (1990: 308) 
suggest "rapid and concentrated population growth ... [along with] steady rates of public 
consumption ... create severe pollution problems." Thus, state popUlation as an 
independent variable serves a dual role: first, to account for the influence that citizens, 
numerically, have on creation and execution of environmental policies. Second, 
population accounts for a relationship between mass consumption and pollution severity 
levels. In this model, state population data are provided through the State and 
Metropolitan Area Data Book (2000). 
Hula (2000) discusses the influence that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
region has on environmental protection plans and initiatives. Using a series oft-tests, 
Hula (2000) finds that there are significant differences which pinpoint EPA region 5 as 
more "innovative" leaders in brownfield redevelopment programs. In this model, EPA 
region serves as an indicator of geographic factors that influence support of brownfield 
redevelopment. Furthermore, the ELI (2001) provides data concerning each state' s EPA 
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region, ranging from Region 1 to Region 10. According to Hula's (2000) findings, 
Region 5 includes Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin, which 
suggest that geographic proximity, and perhaps a shared political/regional culture, 
influence support for environmental redevelopment. 
Fiscal variables account for the impact that financial resources have on a state's 
capacity and willingness to support brownfield redevelopment. This model uses 3 
indicators of financial wellbeing: 
1. The amount of federal grants received accounts for the success and 
effectiveness of national intervention in state initiatives. Lester and 
Lombard (1990: 312) discuss how "federal activities in the 
environmental area have been a major influence on state environmental 
programs," including the effect of federal aid on state spending. 
Therefore, my model attempts to fill this gap by testing whether there is 
a significant relationship between the dollar amount of grants received 
from the federal government, and a state's likelihood of supporting 
environmental programs. Data concerning the dollar amount of federal 
grants received by each state is provided through the EPA's 
Brownjields Grants Fact Sheet (2000). 
2. The size of each state's clean-up fund, the amount of money allocated 
for redevelopment and clean-up programs also indicates each state's 
capacity and willingness to promote environmental initiatives. The 
ELI (2001) reports the balance in each state's fund at the end of the 
2000 fiscal year. Nine states (Arkansas, Washington D.C., Kansas, 
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Nevada, Ohio, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming) did not provide information concerning the state fund; 
however, ELI (2001) totaled the amount of state funds for 
environmental redevelopment programs at $1.24 billion. 
3. Tax revenues indicate each state's actual financial resources and their 
ability to realistically contribute to their brownfield redevelopment 
programs. Both Lester and Lombard (1990) and Bacot & Dawes 
(1997: 3) account for financial health in their arguments, hypothesizing 
that "a state's current fiscal health displays its ability to fund certain 
programs." This data will also be provided through the State and Area 
Metropolitan Data Book (2000).2 
The final independent variable, pollution severity, tests whether a state's 
propensity to support environmental clean-ups is associated with overall levels of 
pollution. Lester and Lombard (1990: 308) suggest "severe pollution problems .. .in tum, 
bring about strong pressures for environmental protection policies." In this model, 
measuring the number of National Priority List sites within each state operationalizes 
pollution severity. According to Hula (2000: 14), "the National Priority List is comprised 
of the nation's most seriously contaminated sites." These sites are reserved for federal 
action; however they are an accurate indicator of the severity of pollution within the 
individual states. The ELI provides a list of approximately 1200 NPL sites, varying from 
o (zero) in North Dakota to 111 sites in New Jersey. Using each state's number ofNPL 
sites as an indicator of pollution severity provides a uniform standard of measurement 
while acknowledging the variance among states. 
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Proposed Models 
Revised model are presented below: 
Modell: Completed sites = a + b I (Population) + b2 (EPA region) + b3 (federal 
grants) + b4 (Clean-up fund) + bs (tax revenues) 
+ b6 (NPL sites) 
Model 2: Clean-upslNPL sites = a + bI (Population) + b2 (EPA region) + b3 (federal 
grants) + b4 (Clean-up fund) + bs (tax revenues) 
Model3a: Staff = a + bI (Population) + b2 (EPA region) + b3 (federal grants) + b4 
(Clean-up fund) + bs (tax revenues) + b6 (NPL 
sites) 
Model3b: StaffIPopulation * 100,000 = a + bt (EPA region) + b2 (federal grants) + 
b3 (Clean-up fund) + b4 (tax revenues) + bs (NPL 
sites). 
Analysis and Results 
The paper tests three models to investigate the relationship between state adoption 
ofbrownlield redevelopment programs and state (1) population, (2) EPA region, (3) 
fiscal expenditures and revenues, (4) pollution severity: 
Modell: Completed sites = a + b I (Population) + bz (EPA region) + b3 (federal 
grants) + b4 (Clean-up fund) + bs (tax revenues) 
+ b6 (NPL sites) 
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Model2: Clean-upslNPL sites = a + b1 (Population) + b2 (EPA region) + b3 (federal 
grants) + b4 (Clean-up fund) + bs (tax revenues) 
Model3a: Staff = a + bi (Population) + b2 (EPA region) + b3 (federal grants) + b4 
(Clean-up fund) + bs (tax revenues) + b6 (NPL 
sites) 
Model3b: Staff/Population * 100,000 = a + bl (EPA region) + b2 (federal grants) + 
b3 (Clean-up fund) + b4 (tax revenues) + bs (NPL 
sites) 
I hypothesize that each dependent variable (number of clean-ups completed, clean-
upslNPL sites, staff, and staff/population), is positively related to the independent 
variables because previous literature and studies indicate that states with bigger 
populations, with larger fiscal resources, and also higher pollution severity are likely to 
have more success and staff for their brownfield redevelopment programs. 
Modell 3 
Analysis of Model 1, using the standardized coefficients,4 yields the following 
equation: 
Completed sites = 455.875 + 0.037 (population) - 0.121 (EPA region) + 0.098 (federal 
grants) + 0.020 (Clean-up fund) + 0.101 (tax 
revenues) - 0.077 (NPL sites). 
No coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. Furthermore, according to the coefficient 
of determination (0.046), this model accounts for only 4.6% of variance within the cases. 
None of the independent variables, population (P-Yalue = 0.950), EPA region (P-Yalue 
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0.672), federal grants (P-Value = 0.683), clean-up fund (P-Value = 0.946), tax revenues 
(P-Value =:: 0.854), and NPL sites (P-Value = 0.787) meet the 95% confidence level. 
These results indicate no association between the number of completed sites and state 
popUlation, EPA region, federal grants received, size of clean-up fund, tax revenues, and 
NPL sites. 
Model 2 
The second regression model produced the following equation: 
Clean-upslNPL sites = 45.531 - 0.100 (Population) - 0.239 (EPA region) + 0.147 
(federal grants) + 0.048 (Clean-up fund) + 0.215 
(tax revenues) - 0.270. 
Again, this model had no significant coefficients. In this case, the coefficient of 
determination (0.126) accounts for 12.6% of variation within the cases. No variable 
meets the 95% confidence level. No association between clean-ups per NPL sites and the 
independent variables were found. 
Model3a: 
Model 3a produced the following equation: 
Model3a: Staff = -12.808 + 0.507 (Population) + 0.055 (EPA region) + 0.156 
(federal grants) + 0.721 (Clean-up fund) - 0.303 
(tax revenues) + 0.007 (NPL sites). 
In this model, two variables, popUlation (P-Value 0.027) and clean-up fund (P-Value = 
0.000) meet the 95% confidence level. The remaining variables, EPA region (P-Value = 
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0.592), federal grants (P-Value = 0.103, tax revenues (P-Value = 0.152, and NPL sites 
(P-Value = 0.948) are not significant at the 0.05 level. These results indicate a positive 
relationship between state staffing levels and the state population, where the bigger the 
population, more staff is apportioned to conduct the various state programs. There is also 
a significant, positive relationship between staffing and the size of the state funds allotted 
to environmental clean-up, and brownfield redevelopment. States also designate more 
staff to programming and other initiatives. Therefore, both population and fund size 
influence this measurement of state effort. 
I also tested this model without the two significant variables: (l) without 
popUlation and (2) without the clean-up fund variable.5 
1. This regression (conducted without the population variable) continued to find 
the fund variable significant (P-Value = 0.000). This strengthens the 
independent relationship between clean-up fund and staffing levels. 
Interestingly, federal grants (P-Value = 0.048) is also significant in this 
model. This suggests one reason that, though population predicts clean-up 
activity, it is correlated to federal grant funding. 
2. Testing this model without the fund variable has similar results. The 
significance of the population variable is strengthened (P-Value = 0.003) and 
remains positive. However, tax revenues become negative and significant (P-
Value = 0.037). This result suggests an increased effort by states with smaller 
revenues to employ brownfield redevelopment program. 
Model3b 
Testing this model provided the following results: 
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Model3b: StafflPopulation * 100,000 = 1.533 - 0.144 (EPA region) - 0.060 (federal 
grants) + 0.647 (Clean-up fund) - 0.257 (tax 
revenues) + 0.271 (NPL sites). 
This model also yielded three significant coefficients: clean-up fund (P-Value = 0.000), 
tax revenues (P-Value 0.032) and NPL sites (P-Value = 0.039). The remaining 
variables, EPA region (P-Value = 0.213) and federal grants (P-Value = 0.598 did not 
meet the 95% confidence level. Not surprisingly, the magnitude of state clean-up funds 
is positively related to per capita staffing. Tax revenues are negatively related to 
staff/population. This presents a counter-intuitive finding that states with smaller 
revenues allocate more staff to brownfield redevelopment programs. In this model, we 
observe pollution severity, indicated by NPL sites, is positively associated with per capita 
staffing levels.6 
Discussion 
Research Summary 
This paper sought to identify different independent variables that predict aspects 
of state success and investment in brownfield redevelopment initiatives. The number of 
sites completed and a ratio between sites completed and the NPL sites served as a 
measurement of state success in the brownfield redevelopment programs. Additionally, 
state effort and investment in brownfield clean-up was measured through staff and 
staff/lOO,OOO population. The paper hypothesized the relationship between a state's 
popUlation, EPA region, fiscal revenues/expenditures, and pollution severity and the 
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likelihood that the given state would adopt and staff the redevelopment programs. An 
analysis of three separate models revealed that the number of completed sites and clean-
upslNPL sites is not a significant measure of state program success. However, using the 
set of effort and investment variables (staffing and staff/l 00,000 population), my models 
found state population, revenues/expenditures, and pollution severity to be significant 
factors leading states to staff their brownfield redevelopment programs. 
Staffhas a strong, positive association with both population and the size of the 
state fund allocated to redevelopment programs. States with a larger population are more 
likely to have higher levels of staffing to implement brownfield redevelopment programs. 
According to Lester and Lombard (1990: 308), this relationship could be a result of 
severity, where states with bigger populations yield higher "rates of public consumption 
[to] bring about pressures for environmental protection policies." States that have 
dedicated larger funds to the redevelopment programs also are more likely to have a 
higher staffing level. However, when assessing the model without the fund variable, tax 
revenues becomes negatively significant. According to Lester and Lombard (1990: 308), 
"states with greater fiscal resources spend more on environmental protection;" however 
my model suggests that states with smaller revenues dedicate more staff to their 
programs. This depicts an interesting relationship where less wealthy states are able to 
maximize their redevelopment programs despite lower tax revenues. Furthermore, in 
removing the popUlation variable, federal grants becomes positively significant. Lester 
and Lombard (1990: 312) noted a failure in the environmental protection literature to 
consider "federal-level variables affect state politics and policy in the environmental 
area." My model is able to account for this relationship and suggests that there is a 
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relationship between states that receive higher levels offunding from the federal 
government and more staff for brownfield redevelopment programs. 
Staff! 1 00,000 population yielded similar results to the staffing variable. In this 
model, size of state fund is still positive and significant. Therefore, in evaluating staff per 
capita, fund still plays a role. Tax revenues variable remains negative and significant, 
again indicating that states with smaller resources are dedicating relatively higher levels 
of staff to their program. Additionally, pollution severity, operationalized by the NPL 
sites variable is positive and significant. This suggests that states with more NPL sites 
and a higher pollution severity level are more likely to employ more staffllOO,OOO 
population. This is consistent with Bacot and Dawes' (1997: 360) findings, "population 
and pollution are overriding factors paramount to understanding state's environmental 
plights." Furthermore, my models propose that pollution severity is a major influence of 
staffing levels and staff!l 00,000 population; however population, tax revenues, and also 
funding (state fund and also federal funding) are intervening variables which also affect a 
state's propensity to staff brownfield redevelopment programs. 
Shortcomings and Errors 
My first two models, making use of sites completed as the dependent variables 
did not identify in any significant variables. This could be attributed to the lack of 
consistency between states on how to define a "clean-up." For example, both New Jersey 
(3,500 completed sites) and Massachusetts (2,800 completed sites) could possibly be 
including certain sites that other states may not include in their reports. (Note, the ELI 
does acknowledge variation among states.) 
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Hula (2001) found EPA region influences state adoption of redevelopment 
policies and initiatives. However, the EPA region variable is not significant in any of my 
models. This poses many questions. Hula (200 I) discusses policy diffusion, suggesting 
that as states create programming, neighboring states, sharing similar characteristics, will 
also adopt these initiatives. Analysis of environmental redevelopment at the regional 
level suggests that there are policies that vary from region to region. There are also 
cultural or geographic differences that could impact state environmental policy and 
initiatives. Though the dependent variables in my models are not significantly associated 
with EPA region, there are other variables, including the structure of state environmental 
organization and political agenda setting that may impact regional level environmental 
programs (Bacot & Dawes, 1997). 
Conclusion 
This analysis of state characteristics related the adoption of brownfield 
redevelopment programs identified four significant findings: 
1. Use of sites completed (clean-ups) and sites completedlNPL sites are not a 
significant indicator of state success relative to population EPA region, fiscal 
revenues/expenditures, and pollution severity. 
2. State population and the size of state funds allocated to brownfield 
redevelopment are positive and significantly related to levels of staff that each 
state allots to run their environmental programming. Furthermore, tax 
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revenues (negative) and federal funding (positive) also playa significant role 
in state staffing levels. 
3. State fund and pollution severity (NPL sites) are positive and significantly 
related to state staffing levels per 100,000 population. Additionally, the tax 
revenues variable is negatively significant, raising a question regarding the 
staffing levels of state's with smaller fiscal resources. 
4. Pollution severity is a major indicator of state staffing levels and 
staff/population, while population, revenues, and fund serve as intervening 
variables. 
These findings argue that state population, revenues (state taxes), funding (state 
and federal), and pollution severity are associated with state effort and investment 
in brownfield redevelopment. In evaluating state brownfield redevelopment 
policies and initiatives, it is essential to take these variables into account. 
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Appendix A 
Correlation between Staff and StaffIPopulation (100,000) 
I STAFFl STAFFP 
i NG OP 
STAFFING Pearson 1 .793(**) i Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 I 
N 52 47 
STAFFPOP Pearson 
.793(**) 1 
• Correlation 
~g. (2-tailed) .000 
47 47 
** Correlation IS significant at the 0.01 level (2-talled). 
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Appendix B 
Correlation between Federal Grants, State Fund, and Tax Revenues 
FEDORA TAXREV 
NT FUND EN 
FEDORANT Pearson 1 .186 .374(**) Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .187 .006 
N 52 52 52 
FUND Pearson 
.186 1 .125 Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .187 .376 
N 52 52 52 
TAXREVEN Pearson 
.374(**) .125 1 Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .376 
N 52 I 52 52 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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AppendixC 
Regression 
Summary 
Modell: Model 2: Clean-Completed Sites as Model 3a: Staff as Variable UpslNPL Sites as Dependent Dependent Variable Dependent Variable Variable 
Population -4.301 E-06 (0.000) -1.000 E-006 (0.000) 6.402 E-06* (0.000) 
EPA Region -35.296 (88.111) -6.0~9 (6.143) 1.758 (3.236) 
Federal Grants 0.000 (0.000) 1.450 E-005 (0.000) 1.940 E-05 (0.000) 
Clean-Up Fund 3.753 E-07 (0.000) 7.640 E-008 (0.000) 1.379 E-06*** (0.000) 
Tax Revenues 9.243 E-06 (0.000) ! 1.690 E-006 (0.000) -3.081 E-06 (0.000) 
NPL Sites -2.811 (10.238) -- 0.028 (0.421) 
-""" 
* * * Indicates significance at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, and *at the 0.05 level 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Model3b: 
StafflPopulation as 
Dependent Varia bit 
--
-0.168 (0.131) 
-2.724 E-07 (0.000) 
4.490 E-08*** {O.OOO 
-9.503 E-08* (0.000) 
0.041 * (0.019) 
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AppendixD i I 
I 
Regression 
Summary 
i Model3a, without . Model 3a, without 
Variable Population Clean-up Fund 
1.380 E-05** 
Population 
--
(0.000) 
EPA Region 5.261 (3.120) -4.511 (4.854) 
2.528 E-05* 
Federal Grants (0.000) 2.090 E-05 (0.000) 
1.592 E-06* 
i Clean-Up Fund (0.000) --
-7.402 E-06* 
Tax Revenues 1.314 E-06 (0.000) (0.000) 
r-----
NPL Sites -0.197 (0.445) 0.713 (0.494) 
***Indicates significance at the 0.001 level, **at the 0.01 level, and *at the 0.05 
level 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
I 
! 
i 
I 
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Footnotes 
1. Insert Appendix A. 
2. Insert Appendix B. 
3. Insert Appendix C. 
4. While regression summaries include using unstandardized coefficients, regression 
equations use standardized coefficients 
5. Insert Appendix D. 
6. Regressions were also conducted without two major outliers (New Jersey and 
Massachusetts); however there was no effect on significance. 
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